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THE SEEDS OF LIFE AND DEATH
Gregory P. Drescher
I.Introduction
Terminally ill patients axe constantly seeking and hoping for the
discovery of that miracle treatment which will put an end to their suering and
provide them with a new chance at life. For those of them with cancer, that
treatment may already exist. For decades, the medical profession has known
the conceivably life-saving eects of a simple extraction from apricot seeds {
commonly known as Laetxile.1 The medical community has not been in wide
agreement on the eectiveness of this product, though. In addition, the product
has never been approved by the FDA, thus tying the believers' hands in attempts
to aid the dying in their last days with any possible cure. But for the interference
of the government in its quest to provide safe and eective drugs, many of those
already in the grave may have been saved if they had only known that this
treatment exists. The critical issue of when it is proper for the government to
intervene in people's personal choices and the potentially devastating results
on their lives and bodies is instrumental in the development and approval of
1Laetrile is the name of a product whose major component or ingredient is the chemical
amygdalin, a substance that occurs naturally in the pits of apricots, peaches, bitter almonds
and in other plant materiaL Bjgh~rf~zdv. Ink~..Sta~s, 438 F.Supp. 1287, 1295 n.17 (W.D.
OkIa. 1977). Additionally, Laetrile, Amygdalin and Vitamin B- 17 axe all one in the same,
and the term Laetrile will be used to represent allthree. Ejgh~rbr4v. Lnii~4.Sig~, 424 F.Supp.
105, 106 (W.D. Okia. 1977).
1experimental new drugs that could aid in wiping out life-threatening illnesses
from society. This paper serves as a preliminary guide to the issues at stake
when government policies and standards stand in the way of experimentation
and innovation.
Many complex issues arise when evaluating the ramications of the FDA's
treatment of [aetrile. While the implications of the strife created by Laetrile have
much farther reaching eects regarding FDA's treatment of specialized proce-
dures for life-threatening ailments and drugs, this paper will not explore the
broader elaborate issues involving such experimental drugs or the extended his-
tory of the various products that this controversy has evolved around. Instead,
this paper is limited in scope to the competing interests among the govern-
ment, the doctors, the patients, and the general public, and the proper means
of balancing these interests to derive the greatest benet to all Furthermore,
the relation of this controversy to the issues elicited in debates over the right to
die and the foundational basis of death with dignity will be examined.
This paper's subsequent evaluation of the competing interests sur-
rounding the administration of Laetrile leads me to the conclusion that several
goals must be kept in mind when developing appropriate solutions. As will be
displayed, paternalistic governmental intervention must be eliminated to pre-
vent the continuance of a policy that causes desperate people { particularly
the auent who can aord it { to go to alternative sources, including foreign
countries and the black market, for treatment that may serve to prolong their
2lives. To supplement this, doctors must be allowed to go about their jobs, free
from the fear of not being able to treat their patients adequately due to the
unavailability of Laetrile or even potential criminal prosecution. In addition,
the right of privacy must be recognized and enforced in this situation to free
up patient autonomy and freedom of choice by making the product accessible
through informed consent and exploration of all possible treatments. This will
in turn provide public awareness of new avenues of health care and allow willing
patients to serve as test subjects for future treatment. Finally, the overwhelming
interest of the right of a person to live and die with dignity must be recognized
and respected.
H.History in the Courts and Government Involvement: The R~~~h~rfw4
Decisions
For several decades, Laetrile has been used by many doctors as a
last resort treatment of patients who have no other hope of survivaL While the
eectiveness of this strange product, derived from apricot seeds, is unproven and
pronounced by many to be mere quackery, a large group of doctors believe that
it can have a benecial eect.2 In fact, a report of the Cancer Commission of
the California Medical Association in 1953 acknowledges the long-standing use
of Laetrile. Although the report concludes that it is ineective as a complete
cure for cancer, it does state that the drug is generally recognized as safe and
perhaps even palliative to some degree.3
Although doctors have been clandestinely treating their patients
2See Biatk~i~rd v. In &.Sia~, 438 F.Supp. 1287, 1294 n. 15 (W.D. OkIa. 1977).
3B.uih~rf~tdv. IJnk .S1a~, 429 F.Supp. 506, 512 (W.D. OkIa. 1977).
3with Laetrile for decades, the issue was not thrust into the limelight until alter
the 1962 Drug Amendments and the refocusing of FDA enforcement.4 After
the withdrawal of Krebiozen from the market as a result of its classication
as an illegal new drug, cancer patients spoke out more vigorously. The FDA
attempted to do the same with Laetrile by banning interstate shipment of it
since an NDA had not been led or approved on the drug's behalf5 The issue
did not fully reach the public spectrum and political context, though, until the
case of~j~~4 v.6
For the rst time in the history of the FDA, an injunction was
issued against the agency, precluding it from preventing the importation and
administration of a drug as a treatment for disease. The Oklahoma District
Court found that laetiile is not a toxic or hannil substance if used in proper
dosage but is on the other hand an alternative treatment of cancer which can
be used in lieu of surgery or radiation cobalt.7 The court found that the FDA's
inaction in approving Laetrile as a treatment for cancer resulted in the depri-
vation of terminal patients' free choice in opting for such treatment. Therefore,
the court ruled, that irreparable harm to the plainti overshadows the possible
harm to the defendants or other interested persons8 and issued the aforemen-
tioned injunction. An appeal followed which resulted in the injunction being
4For a thorough discussion of the eorts of cancer victims to secure the use of Laetrile
for treatment and the subsequent extensive history in the courts, see Peter Barton Hutt &
Richard A. Merrill, Use of Laetrile for Cancer, in Food and Drug Law 557-59.
5See Ii~~ki v. C~kkr~zz~, 375 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1967); Buth~rb~d v. Am~zkaa.M~.dka1
A~n, 379 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1967); ~j~yj~ v. B~i~ha 4~zi, 479 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1973).
6~ F.Supp. 1208 (W.D. OkIa. 1975).
71d. at 1214-15.
81d. at 1214.
4upheld9 and the case being remanded to the FDA to provide an administrative
record containing substantial evidence of Laetrile's status as a new drug.10 The
case went on to become certied as a class action suit and the district court reaf-
rmed the injunction, now pertaining to all terminally ill cancer patients who
had no other possible form of treatment, who would receive the drug in conjunc-
tion with other treatments, or who desired Laetrile after being fully informed of
all possible modes of treatment.11 After much debate, the FDA established in
1977 that it still had authority over the drug since it was illegal and distributed
in interstate commerce.12 The district court once again armed the error in the
FDA's judgment and reinstated the injunction, invoking constitutional grounds
of the right of privacy.13 The Tenth Circuit then reviewed the decision and up-
held the injunction for terminally ill patients in need of intravenous injections
of Laetrile by a physician.14 The long debate over this novel form ofjudicial
9~uIhar~t4v. In dSIa~, 542 F.2d 1137(10th Cir. 1976).
10~uth~fQ~ v. Un LSIa~, 424 F.Supp. 105 (W.D. OkIa. 1977).
11The injunctive order of the court included the requirement that an adavit be signed by
a physician when providing Laetrile as treatment:
Such adavit shall include the following:
1. that there is histologic evidence of a rapidly progressive malignancy in the patient posses-
sive of a high and predictable mortality rate; and
2. (a) that further orthodox treatment would not reasonably be expected to benet the pa-
tient; or
(b) that laetrile will be administered only in conjunction with established and recog-
nized forms of cancer treatment; or
(c) that the patient has made a knowing and intelligent election to take laetrile after
being fully apprised of the full range of recognized treatments available and of the fact that
laetrile is considered by most cancer experts to be of no value in combatting the disease.
Rutherford v. k~4...Stai~, 429 F.Supp. 506, 513 (W.D. OkIa. 1977). The injunction covered
all agents of the government and enjoined [them] from impeding or preventing the importation
and interstate transportation of laetrile by any members of the plainti class or their duly
designated agents. Id.
12Commissioner of Food and Drugs announced, Laetrile is not generally recognized by
qualied experts as a safe and eective cancer drug and ~I is not exempt from the pre-
market approval requirement for new drugs by virtue of the 'grandfather' provisions of the
Act. RuUj~fw4 v. I , 438 F.Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D. Okla. 1977), citing 42 Fed.Reg.
39768-39806 (1977).
131d.
14Euih~~x4v. d.S1~i~, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978).
5intervention versus agency discretion was destined to appear before the United
States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, in a surprising move that would reverberate
throughout the lower courts, ruled that the FD&C Act makes no special pro-
vision for drugs used to treat terminally ill patients.15 In so ruling, the Court
recognized the inherent danger for terminal patients in doctors promoting the
use of unproven drugs in lieu of conventional treatments. As the Court stated,
[or the terminally ill ... a drug is unsafe if its potential for inicting death or
physical injuiy is not oset by the possibility of therapeutic benet,16 especially
when the choice to change treatments would no longer exist afterward. As a
result of this ruling, the case was remanded to determine the validity of the
constitutional arguments and the status of the injunction.
Pediaps for the rst time, the Tenth Circuit arrived at the heart of
the matter and viewed the issue as a constitutional conict between the patient's
right to privacy in determining the appropriate individual treatment and the
governmental interest in protecting public health.17 The court limited the right
of the patient by coming down on the side of the government and nding the
need for regulation of Laetrile as a drug. The case was remanded to the district
court to resolve the issue of the injunctions, which were subsequently dissolved
and the complaint dismissed.18 Although further futile litigation occurred at
15!Jnit~4..S1al~v. Rjg1~rb~d, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979).
161d. at 556.
17 ~uIh dv. IJnit~.SIat~, 616 F.2d 455 (lOthCir. 1980). SeeaIsof~agJJDJjJAv. Unii~d
S1al~,616F.2d 1120 (9thCir. 1980).
181983- 1984 Jud. Rec. 173 (W.D. Okia. 1984).
6the behest of the plaintis,19 the matter was essentially resolved in favor of the
government.
The issue framed by the Tenth Circuit | although deciently ex-
plored { is the foundation for future evaluation of the use of Laetrile. The court
rightfully saw this as a conict between patient autonomy and the government's
broad responsibility to the general public's health and safety. Absent from the
court's analysis, though, are the various other interests at stake, involving not
only the government and the patient, but the doctors and the general public as
well. m.Governmental Interests
The government serves a vital role in our society by protecting the
health and safety of the general public. For this purpose, the government has
enacted much legislation and set up a multitude of agencies that regulate crucial
areas of citizens' lives. As with any regulation, certain rights are encroached
upon and a proper balance must be derived to establish policies that will enable
citizens to live freely, but safely.
The Food and Drug Administration is perhaps the most notable
agency involved in assessing public health and safety. The regulations passed
by the FDA are aimed to guarantee the safety and integrity of food, drugs, cos-
metics, and medical devices. For the purposes of analysis, the FDA's standards
in approving drugs must be briey examined.
Due to the potential for both great physical benet and physical
harm, the FDA has imposed stringent standards when evaluating drugs. New
19See Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Use of Laefrile for Cancer, in Fm~4auil)nag
La~& 559.
7drugs, in particular, are subject to the most exacting premarketing stages before
being approved for nationwide sale, ranging from preclinical research to clinical
research (IND, Phases I, LI, III) to FDA evaluation of a new drug application.20
The ostensible goal of this elaborate process is to establish the safety and eec-
tiveness of each drug product. While this laudable purpose is vital in assurung
the general public of the integrity of pharmaceuticals, those who are terminally
ill are justiably frustrated by such a time-consuming process.
For cancer patients with a limited time frame for treatment, the
goals of the FDA are conceivably insignicant. If a product does not get out on
the market in time, the patient will have no opportunity to enjoy the pleasures
of knowing that the drugs she would have been using are safe and eective. As
the Tenth Circuit eloquently stated:
[W]hat can generally recognized as safe and eective mean as to
such persons who are so fatally stricken with a disease for which there is no
known cure? What meaning can eective have in the absence of anything which
may be used as a standard? ... What can eective mean if the person, by all
prevailing standards, and under the position the Commission takes, is going
to die of cancer regardless of what may be done.... Clearly the terms have no
meaning under these circumstances... 21
Recognizing the signicance of getting drugs to terminally ill pa-
tients, the FDA has made certain provisions regarding an expedited approval
20For a complete description of the rigorous procedures followed in approving drugs, see
Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Human Drugs, in Food and Drug Law 378-63 5.
21Rudi~d~rd v. Ln d..SIaI, 582 F.2d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 1978).
8process and treatment IND's for those patients who can pay for them. Neither
of these scenarios had any eect on the status of Laetrile, though; as described
supra in section II, the FDA refused to take action on the status of Laetrile
since no NDA existed at the time. At the same time, the FDA was forbidding
the importation of Laetrile through its interstate commerce enforcement pro-
cedures.22 Thus, this eectively denied generations of cancer patients even the
hope that the drug would soon be readily available.
To only view this situation from the cancer patients' perspective,
though, would be unfair to the FDA. While the lives of these patients are of
paramount concern, the wider eects of condoning the usage of an unapproved
drug must be examined. The FDA's basic credibility is at stake. If a drug
for cancer patients was rushed through approval which later was found to be
toxic and shortened patients lifespans, the FDA would face a debacle. As things
now stand, the condence of the general public in the drug approval process is
somewhat weakened by the tremendous delays and years of red tape. At the
same time, the public must understand the limited resources of the FDA, in ad-
dition to the overwhelming concern of another drug scandal Future generations
of cancer patients will also benet from extensive pre-testing to determine if the
use of Laetrile is truly ecacious as a substitute for already proven modes of
treatment. Therefore, although the FDA's inaction may be viewed as unsympa-
thetic by some, the FDA does have an important interest in exercising caution
22See S&h~~~ v. International Alliances of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving Picture Operators
of U.S. and Canadn, 70 F.Supp. 1008 (D.C.CaI. 1947), ad 165 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 812.
9in approving any new drug product.
The government as a whole also has many interests in regulating
the use of Laetrile as against any individual interests in receiving the personally
desired medical treatment. As expressed by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the State has an important
interest in the preservation of life; the protection of the interests of innocent
third parties; the prevention of suicide; and maintaining the ethical integrity
of the medical profession.23 Evaluated together, the predominant state interest
must be in the area of the preservation of life.24 The problematic feature of
this interest is in the potential for divergent interpretations. Those in favor of
government interventionism into personal lives tend to use this phrase broadly
to encompass personal decisions in eveiy aspect of life. The interpretation which
is more reasonable is one that focuses on the government's duty to protect its
citizens from intrusive and unwanted bodily attacks. The government has no
true interest in pronouncing what people are to do with their own lives when
their actions will have no substantial eect on other people's lives. In the case
of terminally ill cancer patients, this is even more obvious. Ifa person is going to
die within a short time, the government has no interest in forcing that person
to undergo every conceivable treatment that is approved, while denying him
23Superintendent of Beichertown State School v. Siik~wi~z, 373 Mass. 728 (1977) (setting
procedures for guardian refusing conventional treatment for incompetent patient suering from
leukemia). See also John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. ~ 58 N.J. 576 (1971); Unit~d..Stai~
v. (j~rg~, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center v.
73 MIsc. 2d 395 (NY. Sup.Ct. 1973); ki W~b~diaL, 79 Misc. 2d 753 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1974);
LuI~ Ka[waU1, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972).
24As asserted by the Supreme Court, the State may simply assert an unqualied interest in
the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests
of the individuaL ~mzanv. Director. Missouri Dept. of Healthy 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853 (1990).
10the option of using a drug he believes will help him more.25 The government
may argue that this is equivalent to the patient committing suicide by refusing
conventional therapy, but that is a matter of individual choice. In fact, most
courts have recognized the right of a competent patient26 to refuse medical
treatment, even if this action will result in death27 Therefore, it is apparent
that the government's interest in preserving life has been subject to limitations
based upon the weight of the competing interests. To back o on this position,
though, would be paramount to a government recognition of its own limitations
in providing for the public's health and safety, particularly the FDA's problems
discussed above.
As a result, terminal patients have been forced to seek other means
of acquiring treatment with Laetrile. On the whole, the FDA has directed its
attention to other pharmaceuticals, thereby not punishing the importation of
Laetrile as long as no commercialization results. Consequently, a large black
market has developed which provides the drug at extremely high cost to a lim-
ited number of people who know how to seek it and can aord it. Many others
travel to Mexico and even Germany, where the drug is more readily available;
unfortunately, this causes patients to abandon treatment with their own doc-
tors, sometimes leaving behind an intense trusting relationship. Seeing the
25To speak of laetrile as being unsafe for these people is bizarre. Additionally, it is connota-
tive of a paternalism incompatible with this nation's philosophy as to the proper relationship
between the government and the citizenry. B~uth~rik~rd v. In d....Sia~, 429 F.Supp. 506,
509 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
26This paper does not deal with the increasingly complex Issues arising from substituted
judgment or incompetency.
27See, e.g., I~k~nv. Mas~a~ini~tt~, 197 U.S. 11 (1905);1Ed~k~nv. l~ilgazd, 44 Misc. 2d 27
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 III. 2d 361 (1965); Ix~Q~kDrn~, 294 A.2d
372 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); HQIm~ v. Sil rCt~iH~p~, 340 F.Supp. 125 (D. Ut 1972).
11undesirable eects of the FDA's inaction, one-third of the states have reacted
by legalizing the drug and eliminating many of the barriers that prevent people
from being treated28 While these eorts have been partially successful in pro-
viding the treatment to many patients, the majority of cancer victims still do
not have this resource. One of the main problem areas is the inadequate ac-
knowledgment of the doctor's prominent role in potentially providing this drug
to likely candidates.
LV. The Doctor's Role and Interests
The traditional role of the doctor is to cure the ill and comfort and
ease the dying. This duty to treat encompasses all treatments that are generally
recognized by the medical profession to be safe and eective. While doctors are
subject to restrictions by the FDA, the predominant concern of physicians is to
provide the best quality care and healing to all their patients.
The unapproved status of the drug Laetrile increases the diculty
of an already burdensome job. Since no validated test exists as to the ecacy
of such treatment for cancer patients, doctors are uncertain about whether this
is truly an option. Many doctors feel, though, that it cannot hurt to at least try
Laetrile as a last-ditch eort to combat cancer before death. Unfortunately, the
current status of the drug makes its distribution unthinkable in most instances.
The limited availability makes the cost prohibitive and only allows the auent
to even consider it as an option. In addition, since Medicare and Medicaid do
not pay for experimental drug treatments, both the indigent and the elderly
28New York was one such state to address the concerns involving the distribution of this
drug:
12are inequitably aected. Thus, the doctor's role to strongly advocate for her
patients is frustrated by inadequate availability of Laetrile in a majority of the
states, along with excessive restrictions as to its usage.
In addition to the exorbitant cost of treatment, doctors remain
reluctant to prescribe Laetrile due to fear of both criminal prosecution and mal-
practice liability. As the Tenth Circuit succinctly stated, the plainti in order to
have and use B17 or laetrile is subjecting himself and his agent to criminal pros-
ecution should plainti contravene prohibitions set out in 355 by making what
plainti feels is a life versus law decision.29 This decision is admittedly more
dicult for the patient since her life is the one at stake, but the possibility of
criminal prosecutions is even more dangerous when applied to doctors. While
the patient realistically has nothing to lose through being charged criminally
(she will die without the drug), the doctor has a disincentive to even discuss the
possibility of attempting treatment. Not mentioning Laetrile would not subject
the doctor to any malpractice liability because it is not a generally recognized
form of treatment. Ironically, it is once the doctor refers to the possibility of
such treatment out of genuine concern for the patient that liability can activate.
This contravenes the state interest in preserving the integrity of the medical
profession.30
Only by guaranteeing that doctors will remain free from criminal
prosecutions and unreasonable malpractice liability, as long as the patient gives
29Continental Oil Co. v. F nii L~1., 338 F.2d 780(10th Cir. 1964).
30There is a state interest in the protection of the medical profession's desire to act arma-
tively to save life without fear of civil liability. Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. $ajj~yj~, 373 Mass. 728, 741 (1977). See also Application of the President & Directors ot
13informed consent and is apprised of all possible modes of treatment, will doctors
be able to fulll their roles as healers and comforters, not hiders of the truth.
If the shackles of liability are lifted from the doctor's hands, the
benecial results will foster awareness and potential innovation. Doctors will be
more open about the eects of treatment with Laetrile, thereby creating a self-
made case study of its eectiveness. In fact, doctors should be required to report
the use and eectiveness to the National Cancer Institute so that a national
record can be compiled. Danger does exist as to the potential deleterious side
eects, the most obvious being the fact that if the drug does not work, the
patient will die and will not be able to try other options. At the same time,
though, doctors will be able to monitor the drug's eects openly and more
easily, thus providing a possible opportunity to switch to alternative treatments
if Laetrile is not having any eect.
Other problems become apparent in light of the new age of man-
aged care, especially when issues of who will pay for the drug are examined. If
patients are forced to pay out-of-pocket for Laetrile, the problem of discrimina-
tion against the poor exists. Doctors may be unwilling and unable to prescribe
or even mention the drug to the indigent since they cannot aord it on their
own. In addition, the wealthy cancer patients may bribe doctors to give them
the medication even where it is currently illegal to do so. At the same time,
physicians have a perverse incentive to not wait for the wealthy to oer, but to
actually solicit large pay-os for providing this miracle cure. In fact,
Georgetown College. Inc. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
14377 U.S. 978 (1964). doctors motivated by greed may be fraudulently pessimistic
about alternative treatments to persuade the rich to opt for the Laetrile as an
expensive supplement to conventional forms of therapy.
While both forcing doctors to inform all patients as to the po-
tential use of Laetrile and shifting the cost to the insurance carriers would
eliminate some of these problems, the diculties of administration still exist.
The poor, whose contributions to the HMO are derived from Medicaid, will
burden the industry by demanding the treatment in addition to conventional
means of therapy. This is not necessarily a bad result if Laetrile proves to be
eective, but the benets of the drug are still disputed and unproven. In addi-
tion, doctors in managed care might have the incentive to cut costs of indigent,
non-contributing patients by providing only the cheaper treatment of Laetrile
{ assuming the price of Laetrile declines when no longer on the black market
{ and allocating more money for higher levels of treatment to those who con-
tribute more to the HMO. The poor, in eect, would be turned into guinea
pigs by receiving only an unproven means of treatment. Stricter enforcement
of malpractice standards would be necessaly to oset this possibility, especially
considering the diminished likelihood that a dying indigent patient would le a
malpractice claim.
The possibility of discriminatory and inequitable distribution of
Laetrile is attenuated by the restrictions placed on health care by predetermined
set funds and limited choice in managed care organization& First, some doctors
who do not believe in the eectiveness of Laetrile may not even tell their patients
15of the treatment. Alternatively, some doctors might prefer to avoid the higher
costs of proven treatments and prescribe only Laetrile, thereby freeing up funds
for other patients in the HMO. With patients not being able to shop around
for doctors, either option is undesirable. Perhaps a solution would be to require
doctors to inform their patients of the possible treatment, while advising them
as to the unknown nature of its eectiveness. This would eliminate the problem
of dierent levels of informed consent and foster patient autonomy.31 Thus,
the doctor will have performed his duty, and personal life and death decisions
will fall in their proper place { the informed and unrestrained hands of the
individual.
V.The General Public Interest
Not only do individual patients~ rights outweigh government inter-
ests, but the interests of the general public do as well. No member of the general
public can accurately know what ailments will befall him in later years; there-
fore, the public has an personal investment in guaranteeing that new drugs are
available when their use is required. Whereas the FDA has prevented adequate
testing on humans, wiing patients should be allowed to participate in treat-
ment tests. By having open testing on terminal humans, doctors and patients
will no longer hide behind closed doors where any benecial or detrimental ef-
fects are not reported. While this immediate availability of the drug may act as
a disincentive for any pharmaceutical company to go through expensive testing
31Of course, this ignores the fact that most doctors exercise a tremendous amount of control
over their patients' decisionmaking and will often be asked by the patient to basically make
the decision for her. Patients tend to seek comfort in the physician's expert knowledge and
assume that the doctor can make a better and more informed decision than they can.
16of Laetrile's eectiveness or improve the product by promoting experiments,
patients are already acting as guinea pigs in an uncontrolled and unreported
experiment. The government must be honest with itself and the public by
recognizing that Laetrile is currently being used behind closed doors, and by
attempting to promote its safe use through proper dissemination of relevant
information.
904-20- 9090
Any concern about the large public cost for such experimentation
is largely unwarranted. Arguably, there is the potential that any toxic side ef-
fects will actually result in higher health care costs to society for the resultant
ailments. This fear is not justied, though, considering the already high cost
to society and the health care industxy of the pre-existing cancer condition.
In fact, Laetrile is potentially a great cost savings if proven eective because
apricots are in plentiful supply and will presumably cost far less than the phe-
nomenal price tag of surgery and radiation cobalt. In addition, the potential
toxicity of the drug has been found by almost all involved as negligible at best.32
Finally, the public interest extends to treating each member of society as a valu-
able individual, regardless of the costs and burdens this may place on others.33
Recognition of the patient's right to privately decide her own fate is an essential
part of this function.
VI. Patients' Individual Rights
32The drug's reputation for nontoxicity, even among its opponents, is amply documented.
B~uh~r~rd v. In1~d...Sl~I~, 438 F.Supp. 1287, 1298 n.24 (W.D. OkIa. 1977).
33Where a person is terminally ill with cancer and unresponsive to other treatments, the
public harm is considerably reduced. Carn~hai v. Unit~4.SInl~, Civ. No. 77-0010-GT (S.D.
Calif 1977).
17Central to the entire analysis of conicting interests is the individ-
ual right to privacy and its role in allowing patients to exercise free choice in
treatment for life-threatening disease. As Justice Douglas pointed out in the
pivotal case of D~ v. ~jtg~, the constitutional right of privacy includes the free-
dom to care for one's health and person and the right to be let alone.34 This
right to privacy encompasses the right to refuse medical treatment and to choose
between medical treatments.35 It seems rather clear that this ability to refuse
treatment is adequate in establishing a patient's right to refuse conventional
means of therapy in exchange for either no treatment at all or for treatment
with Laetrile. Although illegal in many states, the drug Laetrile does not have
any known harmful results. While it may be argued that patients should only
be allowed to use Laetrile in conjunction with accepted means of treatment, this
ies in the face of the common understanding of the right to refuse treatment
and amounts to a form of coercion. To prevent patients from making this choice
is to deprive them of a right secured by the United States Supreme Court.
Considering the special nature of a terminal patient's condition,
the courts have exercised extreme caution before imposing state authority over
patient autonomy. Perhaps the most appropriate analogy is to the controversial
right to die cases in which patients had no hope of recovery and sought to end
their lives prematurely. While applying its analysis to a situation wherein the
court had to evaluate the validity of a substituted judgment of withdrawing
medical treatment for a patient in a persistent vegetative state, the New Jersey
34410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)..
35See cases cited supra note 27.
18Supreme Court stated, [w]e think that the State's interest contra weakens and
the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases
and the prognosis dims.36 Noting Quinlan's hopeless condition, the court felt
that her interests must predominate. Supplementing this validation of patient
autonomy in terminal cases, Justice Brennan has stated:
[Tihe State has no legitimate general interest in someone's life,
completely abstracted from the interest of the person living that life....Thus,
the State's general interest in life must accede to [the patient's] particularized
and intense interest in self-determination in her choice of medical trealmt. There
is simply nothing legitimately to be gained by superseding her decision.37
Once a patient is deemed terminal, there should be no restriction
imposed on how she lives her remaining days, whether in the treatment she re-
ceives or in the manner that she dies. The government's interest in the preserva-
tion of life has no signicance to those who have a radically curtailed lif~span.38
In the case of cancer patients, the government arguably has more of an interest
in patients actually struggling for hope by receiving Laetrile treatment, than in
these patients giving up on all forms of therapy and thus taking an action that
36In the Matter of Karen Oninlnn, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
37Cnlzan v. l~i~.i ~fki~J~, 110 5. Ct. 2841, 2870 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court, herself a cancer victim, lamented over
this tragic scenario:
T
he denial to them of medical treatment, albeit unorthodox, albeit unapproved by a state
agency, must surely take on a Kafkaesque, a nightmare, quality. No demonstrated public
danger, no compelling interest of the state, warrants an Orwellian intrusion into the most
private of zones of privacy. [{1 The state has in the name of protecting the cancer victim
criminalized the doctor who is willing to innovate, wiing to try an unapproved drug with the
consent of his patient. From the terminal patient's viewpoint a new depth of inhumanity is
reached....
v. ~riyit~a, 591 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
19is theoretically equivalent to suicide.39
VII Dying with Dignity
Disregarding all other interests invoked to dispute the right of a
terminal cancer patient to attempt Laetrile as a form of treatment, one con-
troing principle must be cherished { the dignity of the human being. Death is
the most personal and heartrending matter that anyone must encounter. Ter-
minal patients look it in the face every day.40 The government has no stake in
how its people face this challenge. Doctors can only comfort and support their
patients. The public, while presumably sympathetic for the Ill and grateful not
to be in the same situation, serves no function in the personal decisions that
are made. This is an individual tragedy that can either be succumbed to with
despair or stared down with dignity.41
The government, by imposing restrictions on how terminal patients
can be treated, shows a fundamental lack of respect for this personal turmoil
and the need for self-determination. To say that a person cannot attempt a
treatment that some believe can give a second chance at life strips a person of
his self-esteem and hope. This is not respect for the right to die with dignity.
39lronically, this is one situation where the right to privacy conforms with the idea of the
right to life. Perhaps this is one of the few areas where the pro-life movement would agree
with liberals, in that to deprive the patient from making her private choice to take Laetrile,
the government is infringing on her right to live, If no other form of treatment is available,
the government's restriction is eectively the imposition of a death sentence.
40In my view, our understanding as to how life should end must be infused with the funda-
mental human moral values that serve us while we live. As we have faced life, so should we
be able to face death. In the matter of Claire Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 399 (1985) (Handler, J.,
dissenting).
41Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of an ignoble end, steeped
in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme
consequence. (~nizn v. Director.. Missouri Dept. of Health 110 5. Ct. 2841, 2868 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
20More importantly, this is a deprival of a potential miracle, thus constricting the
terminally ill from the right to live with dignity. In the words of Justice Stevens:
We may ... justly assume that death is not life's simple opposite,
or its necessazy terminus, but rather its completion. Our ethical tradition has
long regarded an appreciation of mortality as essential to understanding life's
signicance. Lives do not exist in abstraction from persons, and to pretend
otherwise is not to honor but to desecrate the State's responsibility for protecting
life.42
The courage to face the unknown, but inevitable, is a remarkable
trait { one that should be respected, not deprived.
VIII.Conclusion
While the dierences between the conicting interests in the dispute
over Laetrile seem insurmountable at rst glance, a careful analysis has revealed
some areas where compromise is possible to derive an acceptable result. Of
rst priority is the need for the courts to re-enact the ~uih~zf~rd injunction,
basing such a decision on constitutional grounds involving the outweighing of
governmental interests by individual privacy rights. This will reduce the FDA's
concerns regarding an unspoken validation of the drug's eectiveness. As a
corollary, Laetrile must be legalized in all fty states with a statute similar
to the one in New York, thereby reducing its cost by eliminating the need
for a black market or foreign importation. This will make it readily available
as a special category drug, prewibed by licensed physicians | and available
421d at 2882 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21through pharmacists and hospitals |to terminally Ill patients who exercise
informed consent. In addition, criminal prosecutions and malpractice cases must
be barred as long as patients are told of all their options and sign a waiver of
liability. Insurance companies should also change their policies to pay for the
drug as a treatment for cancer, thus eliminating any discriminatory impact upon
the poor. Finally, doctors should be required to tell all appropriate patients of
this option and keep a record of the results of such treatment to be compiled
nationally to determine the eectiveness of Laetrile once and for alL
These solutions will ultimately stand as an acknowledgment of the
utmost respect for the individua?s need to live and die with dignity. As Judge
Handler once said, [wihen cherished values of human dignity and personal pri-
vacy, which belong to every person living or dying, are suciently transgressed
by what is being done to the individual, we should be ready to say: enough.43
Cancer patients have reached that point. To the government, to the FDA, to
the courts { they say enough.
43In the matter of Claire Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 399 (1985) (Handler, J., dissenting).
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